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NOTE
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GENDER
BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The United States Supreme Court's Review of
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Peremptory challenges by definition2 permit both the plaintiff and
the defendant to strike a limited number of potential jury members with-
out stating a reason. These challenges, which allow the striking party to
remain silent on the reasons behind the strike, provide a potential plat-
form for unconstitutional discrimination in the jury selection process.
This potential for discrimination has resulted in limitations being placed
on peremptory challenges exercised for purely racial reasons. On April
19, 1994, the United States Supreme Court delivered an opinion holding
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection through
the use of the peremptory challenge in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB. 3
Concentrating on the similarities between the plight of women and racial
minorities in the history of the United States, the Court extended the
previous limitations on peremptory challenges from race to gender.4
This decision analysis will first provide a synopsis of the facts and
procedural holdings of J.E.B. The analysis will then focus on a number
of related opinions which form the groundwork upon which the holding
in this case is based. Finally, an evaluation of the case will be presented,
which will include the potential problems the decision will create in fu-
ture jury trials.
1. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
2. Peremptory challenge is defined as:
The right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason
for the challenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an action, both civil and criminal,
has a specified number of such challenges and after using all his peremptory challenges
he is required to furnish a reason for subsequent challenges.
BLAcK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
3. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at. 1430.
4. Id. at 1421. The Court held that "gender, like race, is not a constitutional indication of
juror competence." Id More information and background on the race-based limitation on the
exercise of peremptory challenges will be provided later in this decision analysis.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On behalf of T.B., the mother of a minor child, the State of Alabama
filed a complaint in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama for
paternity and child support against the petitioner J.E.B.5 In October
1991, the case was called for trial and a panel of thirty-six potential ju-
rors, consisting of twelve males and twenty-four females, was assem-
bled.6 The court excused three of these jurors for cause, leaving only ten
males among the thirty-three possible jury members.7 The State, acting
on behalf of the mother, then used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to
remove male jurors, while at the same time the petitioner used all but
one of his strikes to remove female jurors.8 As a result of these peremp-
tory strikes, all of the selected jurors were female.
Before the jury was empaneled, the petitioner objected to the per-
emptory challenges made by the State on the ground that they were ex-
ercised against the male jurors solely on the basis of gender, and
therefore were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9 The court, however, rejected the claim of the peti-
tioner, and the empaneled all-female jury found the petitioner to be the
child's father.10
Subsequently, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion of the District Court.1 ' The Supreme Court of Alabama denied cer-
tiorari in October of 1992.12 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause
forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender as well as on the
basis of race, a question which had created a conflict of authority among
the lower courts.13 Upon review, the Court determined that intentional
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1421-22.
7. Id at 1422.
8. Id. It is important to note that both the respondent and the petitioner used peremptory
strikes to remove jurors on an apparent gender basis.
9. The petitioner argued that the reasoning and logic of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), similarly forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at
1422.
10. Not only did the jury find the petitioner to be the father of the child, but the court also
entered an order directing the petitioner to pay child support to the respondent. On post-
judgment motion, the court again ruled that Batson did not extend to gender-based peremp-
tory challenges. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
11. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). The Court of Civil Appeals
relied on Alabama precedent to reach this decision. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 596 So. 2d 42
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3881 (Oct. 5 1992).
12. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422 (citing No. 1911717 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992)).
13. Id. at 1422, n.1.
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discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal
Protection Clause, particularly where the discrimination concerns stereo-
types which categorize the relative abilities of men and women.14
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
While the Constitution does not expressly confer a right to peremp-
tory challenges, those challenges traditionally have been viewed as one
means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.' 5 In its
analysis, the JE.B. Court identified a number of prior related decisions
which helped determine the constitutional limitations to which peremp-
tory challenges should be subjected. These previous cases illustrate the
difficulties that arise in balancing the desire for an unbiased jury pro-
vided by peremptory challenges against the discrimination an individual
defendant or juror may be subjected to by these unchallenged
exclusions.
A majority of cases leading up to the Court's broad decision concern-
ing gender-based strikes in JE.B. dealt with racial discrimination
through the use of the peremptory challenge. Historically, the types of
discrimination suffered by racial minorities and women have differed. In
the context surrounding peremptory challenges, however, the similarities
between the discrimination experienced by racial minorities and women
overpower any differences.' 6
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky' 7 was the
first in a string of cases that provided the basis for the holding in J.E.B.
In Batson, which was a trial of a black criminal defendant, the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the
venire, leaving a jury composed entirely of white persons. 8 The defense
counsel unsuccessfully moved to discharge the jury on the ground that
the removal of the black veniremen violated the petitioner's rights under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 9 In its reversal of the trial
court, the Supreme Court followed the holding of a one hundred year-
14. Id. The court limited the holding to discrimination by state actors. Note that the
discrimination in this particular case was directed against male jurors and not female jurors.
15. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
219 (1965) and Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1912)).
16. Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV.
L. REv. 1920, 1921 (1992).
17. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
18. Id. at 82-83.
19. Id. at 83. The defense counsel's arguments were based on both the right to a jury
drawn from a cross section of the community under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
and for equal protection under the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial judge
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old case,20 while overruling another more recent case,21 to hold that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor2 from challenging po-
tential jurors either solely because of their race or on the assumption
that black jurors will be unable to be impartial.2 3
Following the decision in Batson, the Supreme Court delivered five
more opinions dealing with the use of peremptory challenges, with the
immediate goal of making it more difficult to engineer all-white juries.24
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ,5 the Court extended the limita-
tions on the peremptory challenge to private litigants in a civil case.2 6 In
deciding whether or not to make this extension, the Court first recog-
nized that the "Constitution's protection of individual liberty and equal
protection apply in general only to actions by the government. ''2 7 Based
on the application of the test set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,28
the peremptory challenges made by the defendant in the District Court
observed that the parties were entitled to use the peremptory challenges to strike anybody
they wanted to, and denied the motion on this basis. Id.
20. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In this case, the Court held that
racial discrimination in the jury selection procedure offended the Equal Protection Clause,
while at the same time recognizing that the defendant had no right to a jury composed in
whole or in part of persons of his own race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
21. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. The Court rejected the high burden of proof that was re-
quired by a previous holding in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, the prosecu-
tor used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six black persons on the petit jury
venire. The Court recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the
exercise of peremptory challenges, but required the defendant to show the prosecutor's sys-
tematic discriminatory use of the peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of
time. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
22. This opinion was limited to the peremptory challenges made by the prosecution. The
Court stated that it expressed no view on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the
exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12.
23. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, pointed out that the holding in
Batson was so extraordinary because it was based on a constitutional argument, equal protec-
tion, that the petitioner expressly declined to raise. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.i., dissenting).
24. Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service,
61 U. CrN. L. REv. 1139, 1141 (1993). See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
25. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
26. Id. at 2080.
27. Id. at 2082 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191
(1988)).
28. 457 U.S. 922. This test was used to determine whether a private litigant can be consid-
ered a government actor. The first part of the test is whether the constitutional deprivation
resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority. The
second part of the test centers around whether the litigant in all fairness must be deemed a
government actor. Id. at 937.
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were determined to be state actions.29 Further, the civil litigants were
given standing to raise the excluded juror's equal protection rights.3"
Next in the string of cases decided after Batson was the Court's 1992
decision in Georgia v. McCollum. 31 This case extended the limitations
already placed on the peremptory challenges to "prohibit a criminal de-
fendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of
race in the exercise of peremptory challenges." 32 The Court, in coming
to this conclusion, identified and answered four questions to determine
the constitutional limitations on the peremptory challenge.31 Upon an-
swering these questions, the Court powerfully stated that regardless of
who invokes the discriminatory challenge, the harm is the same-the ju-
ror is subjected to unconstitutional open and public discrimination. 34 In
an emotional and poignant dissent, Justice Scalia stated his belief that it
was absurd to classify a criminal defendant as someone acting on behalf
of the state.35
Although the Supreme Court has been very active in extending the
racial limitations placed on peremptory challenges in the eight years
since Batson, other courts have been unwilling to extend the peremptory
challenge in ways other than race. The Third Circuit would not extend
protection against peremptory challenges to the use of strikes based on
29. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083. In dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that not everything
that happens in a courtroom is a state action and that peremptory challenges by private liti-
gants are fundamentally a matter of private choice. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2087. Normally, a litigant would not be able to raise the third party interest of
another. Because of the close relationship between the juror and the litigant and the inability
of the juror to protect his or her own rights, the Court allowed the litigant to raise these rights.
Id.
31. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
32. Id. at 2359.
33. Id. at 2353. In deciding whether the Constitution prohibits criminal defendants from
exercising discriminatory peremptory challenges, the Court identified four questions that need
answering:
First, whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson. Second, whether the
exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant constitutes state action.
Third, whether prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional challenge. And
fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant nonetheless preclude
the extension of our precedents to this case.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id at 2364 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that the decision in McCol-
lum was using the Constitution to destroy the right of the criminal defendant to secure a fair
jury through the use of the peremptory challenge. Id. at 2365.
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the language the jurors spoke,36 while the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
fused to expand the reasoning in Batson to challenges based on
religion.3 7
The Court's views on gender-based classifications can best be sum-
marized by a review of its holding in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan.3 ' Although this case does not directly relate to peremptory chal-
lenges, it clearly states that for a gender-based classification to be valid,
there must be a showing of an "'exceedingly persuasive justification' for
the classification. '3 9 The classification must also serve important gov-
ernment objectives, and the discriminatory means employed must be
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. ' 40
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear J.E.B. v.
Alabama with the intent of answering the question which had created a
conflict of authority: whether or not the Equal Protection Clause forbids
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.41 In holding that such
peremptory challenges do violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
expanded the limitations it had previously imposed on peremptory chal-
lenges made for racial reasons.
Justice Blackmun's analysis began with a recognition of where the
Court currently stands with regard to peremptory challenges by discuss-
ing Batson42 and the string of cases which followed. In doing so, Black-
mun stated that the Court has repeatedly recognized that "whether the
trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an
equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from
36. See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994). Five jurors were dismissed in this
case because of their ability to speak Spanish. An argument was made that the jurors were
being challenged because they were Latinos. The court determined the peremptory chal-
lenges were made for trial-based reasons and refused to extend Batson to challenges based on
the language the jurors spoke. Id. at 871.
37. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993). Here, the state used a peremptory
challenge to strike a black male member of the Jehovah's Witness religion. The court refused
to extend Batson to strikes made on the basis of religion, saying it would complicate and erode
the peremptory challenge unnecessarily. Id. at 771.
38. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982). In this case, a male student was denied admission to an all-
female nursing school because of his sex. The male student filed an action claiming his rights
were violated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3334.
39. Id. at 3336 (quoting Kirchberg v. Fienstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
40. Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
41. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
42. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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state-sponsored group stereotypes. . .. "I Based on this, the Court held
that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence
and impartiality." 44
To reach this final holding, the Court first examined the history of
women jurors in the United States. The Court noted that until 1946, the
fundamental fairness of denying women the right to serve on a jury was
never questioned by the Court. In that year, the Court recognized that
men and women were not fungible and that the exclusion of either sex
would change the quality of the community.45 The Court then identified
a decision from 1975, which explained that restricting from jury service
groups "playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with
the constitutional concept of a jury trial. 4 6
After detailing the extent of discrimination that women have faced
regarding jury service, the Court flatly rejected the respondent's argu-
ment that because gender discrimination has never reached the same
level as discrimination against African-Americans, gender discrimina-
tion, unlike racial discrimination, is tolerable in the courtroom. 47 In
striking this argument, the Court determined that it did not need to de-
cide whether women or racial minorities had suffered more, rather, it
only needed to acknowledge the long, unfortunate history of sex discrim-
ination "which warrants the heightened scrutiny afforded to all gender-
based classifications today. '48
Central to the decision in J.E.B. was the need to determine whether
discrimination based on gender in the jury selection process "substan-
tially furthers the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and im-
partial trial."4 9 The Court rejected the argument that the decision to
strike all the males from the jury was made because they may have been
more sympathetic to the man in a paternity suit,50 since this argument is
43. J.E.B, 114 S. Ct. at 1421. Justice Blackmun listed the series of cases which were de-
cided after Batson that extended the limitations on peremptory challenges. Id.
44. ld.
45. Id. at 1424 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)).
46. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).
47. Id. at 1425.
48. Id. The Court also expanded on this to recognize that "gender-based classifications
require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny."
I&a (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) and Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
49. Id.
50. Id. The respondent argued that there was a special State interest in establishing the
paternity of the child that justified the gender-based peremptory challenges in this case. The
Court made it clear that the only legitimate interest in the exercise of peremptory challenges
was securing a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 1426 n.8.
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based on "the very stereotype the law condemns."51 According to the
Court, the respondent incorrectly assumed that gross generalizations,
which would be impermissible if raced-based, would somehow be per-
missible when made on the basis of gender.5'
Peremptory challenges, whether based on race or gender, cause harm
to not only the litigant, but also the community and the particular juror
who is wrongfully excluded.53 The Court focused on the individual ju-
rors, stating that jurors "have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection
procedures," 54 which contrary to the contention of the respondent, ex-
tends to both men and women.55 Accordingly, the Court made a broad
and sweeping statement that "[a]ll persons, when granted the opportu-
nity to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily be-
cause of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and
reinforce patterns of historical discrimination."56
The decision in J.E.B. does not imply, however, the elimination of all
peremptory challenges or conflict with the legitimate interest of a state
in securing a fair and impartial jury.57 When a party wants to remove a
juror, the party can still use a peremptory challenge; however, "gender
simply may not serve as a proxy for the bias."'58 J.E.B. requires that a
party alleging gender discrimination make a prima facie showing of in-
tentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is re-
quired to explain the basis for the strike.5 9 This explanation need not
rise to the level of a "for cause" challenge, 60 but need only be based on a
characteristic other than gender.6'
V. ANALYSIS
The decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama, although supported by prior deci-
sions of the Court, should not be followed. Regardless of the fact that
51. Id. at 1421 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
52. Id. at 1427.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1428 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1419.
59. Id. at 1429.
60. "Iypically, attorneys can use challenges for cause if (1) the juror is related to a party;,
(2) the juror has a unique interest in the subject matter; (3) the juror has served in a related
case; or (4) the juror has a 'state of mind' that will prevent him from acting with impartiality
and without prejudice toward either party." Beyond Batson, supra note 16, at 1934 n. 117.
61. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. The Court requires the same procedure as it did with race-
based strikes in Batson. Id.
1076 [Vol. 78:1069
GENDER BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
the Court was able to identify similarities between the discrimination
based on gender and race, this case only serves to extend previous ques-
tionable holdings. The decision adds further limits to the peremptory
challenge, which by definition,62 should be exercised by either party
without having to give any justification.
Critical to the Court's analysis were the comparisons between the
discrimination felt by blacks and women in the history of the United
States.63 Accepting Batson as being correctly decided, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, argues that because "racial groups comprise nu-
merical minorities in our society," they warrant "a greater need for pro-
tection in some situations, whereas the population is equally divided
among men and women."'  In this case, to say that male jurors were
singled out for discrimination, while at the same time the petitioner was
striking females, is a preposterous notion.65 The use of the peremptory
challenge in this manner was not gender discrimination on either the
male or female jurors, but rather the efficient operation of the peremp-
tory challenge to provide a fair and impartial jury.
Perhaps the most questionable reasoning in the case was the contin-
ued emphasis on the rights jurors have to nondiscriminatory jury selec-
tion procedures.66 The Court argued that "[t]he exclusion of even one
juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public
confidence in the fairness of the system."67 Once only a background
consideration, the goal of protecting those summoned to serve "has now
moved to the center of the analysis."6 Giving the stricken jury members
such a broad constitutional right often times comes at the expense of the
accused.69 The peremptory challenge, although not a constitutionally
62. See supra note 2.
63. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
64. Id at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further noted that the situation would
have been different if both sides systematically struck individuals of one group so as to elimi-
nate them from the pool of potential jury members. Id.
66. IL at 1427-28.
67. Id. at 1428 n.13.
68. Babcock, supra note 24, at 1142.
69. Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion in McCollum, emphasized this point by
stating:
Our departure from Strauder has two negative consequences. First, it produces a seri-
ous misordering of our priorities. In Strauder, we put the rights of defendants fore-
most. Today's decision, while protecting jurors, leaves defendants with less means of
protecting themselves.... In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries
over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the ju-
rors, who faces imprisonment or even death.
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conferred right,70 is one of the most important rights secured to the ac-
cused.71 By adding yet another limitation on the exercise of the peremp-
tory challenge, the Court is further restricting the defendant's powerful
tool for use in the selection of an impartial jury.
The opinion in J.E.B. by Justice Blackmun was clearly written to pro-
vide the framework for subsequent limitations on the peremptory chal-
lenge for reasons other than gender. Opening the door for future
litigation, the Court stated that the juror has "the right not to be ex-
cluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presump-
tions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination. 72
Future cases will likely increase the limitations on the peremptory chal-
lenge to discrimination based on classifications such as religion and sex-
ual orientation, as well as other possible categories yet unthought of.
The Court, which was not yet ready to eliminate a century old doc-
trine, stated that the conclusion in J.E.B. does not eliminate all peremp-
tory challenges.73 It does go a long way, however, toward that end.
Since any correlation between a juror's gender and his or her attitudes in
the courtroom was determined to be irrelevant,74 it is hard to imagine
any peremptory challenges that can stand up to questioning from the
opposing party. Although the party making the peremptory challenge
may still be able to remove the juror, the questioning alone changes the
peremptory challenge into something entirely different than its intended
purpose, which is a strike from the jury without a given reason.
If this case is to be followed, which seems likely based on the recent
trends of the Court, the decision should be limited to a prohibition only
on the government's use of gender-based peremptory challenges, since
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination only by state ac-
tors.75 In the string of cases following Batson, the Court extended the
race-based limitation to civil litigants76 and defendants in a criminal
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
71. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
72. Id. at 1428. It is interesting to note that the Court made this statement in a case in
which males were being discriminated against. The Court seemed to be contradicting itself
from the start, since there is hardly a historical pattern of discrimination against males. Id at
1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1429.
74. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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trial. 7 Since civil litigants and criminal defendants are clearly not state
actors, this mistake should not be extended to gender-based limitations
as well.78
The J.E.B. case is likely to have a profound impact on the number of
future appeals stemming from criminal and civil jury trials. Since every
person excluded from a jury is either male or female, there is a possibil-
ity for arguing discrimination in every peremptory challenge that is
made. Justice O'Connor recognized this, stating that by "further consti-
tutionalizing jury selection procedures, the Court increases the number
of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will become part of
the main event. 79
VI. CONCLUSION
The peremptory challenge, which can be used to exclude someone
from a jury without giving a reason, is the breeding ground for many
types of unconstitutional discrimination. The United States Supreme
Court recognized this potential for discrimination and limited the use of
peremptory challenges when based on race alone. In J.E.B. v. Alabama,
the Court places further limitations on the peremptory challenge, stating
that these previously unchallenged strikes of potential jury members
cannot be based solely on gender. The Court's broad holding achieved
this objective by focusing on the Equal Protection Clause and the simi-
larity between discrimination based on gender and race. By providing
yet another limitation on the peremptory challenge, the Court took one
more step toward the total elimination of this challenge as it is currently
known.
JOSEPH D. KuBoRN
77. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
78. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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